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INTRODUCTION 
by  
Joachim Whaley and Len Scales 
 
This special issue is devoted to a subject that has experienced a remarkable transformation 
during the last sixty years. In the 1960s, as work on virtually every period in German history 
after 1800 flourished in the English-speaking world, almost no attention was paid to the Holy 
Roman Empire. As Tim Blanning recently recalled, when he became interested in German 
history before 1800 as a student at Cambridge in the 1960s there was no body of English-
language research on the subject and little interest in creating one.1 That was true particularly 
of the early modern period but medieval German history fared little better. The comments to 
be found in the most popular surveys of German history, A.J.P. Taylor’s The Course of 
German History and Geoffrey Barraclough’s The Origins of Modern Germany, were not 
encouraging.2 Blanning’s study of Mainz in the eighteenth century was very much a 
pioneering work when it appeared in 1974.3 That German History can publish a special issue 
devoted to the Holy Roman Empire and that the editors find themselves spoilt for choice in 
selecting contributors is testimony to the extraordinary profusion of work on the empire that 
is now being pursued. The publication of three major works on the empire by UK historians 
since 2012 also underlines its significance as a topic of research in the English-speaking 
world.4 This has all unfolded in the context of important changes in attitude to the Holy 
Roman Empire among German scholars. Since most of the work that has been done on the 
empire in the English-speaking world both reflects and responds to German scholarship some 
account of those changes is essential. 
Almost everyone who has worked on the empire is wearily familiar with Voltaire’s sardonic 
quip that it was ‘Neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire’. Quite frequently this is the only 
thing that non-historians, and many historians of modern Germany, know’ about the Holy 
Roman Empire. Yet the statement is in fact invariably misquoted.  These words in Voltaire’s 
essay on the customs and spirit of nations published in 1756 referred specifically to the 
empire at the end of the reign of Charles IV. Voltaire meant simply that once it had largely 
shed its concern with Italy and the papacy its title was no longer accurate. On the whole, his 
view of the empire as a German polity was rather positive; and his view was similar to that of 
                                                          
1 T.C.W. Blanning, ‘The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation past and present’, Historical Research, 85 
(2012), pp. 57-70. 
2 A. J. P. Taylor, The Course of German History: a Survey of the Development of German History since 1815 
(1945); G. Barraclough, The Origins of Modern Germany (Oxford, 1947). 
3 T.C.W. Blanning, Reform and Revolution in Mainz, 1743–1803 (Cambridge, 1974). 
4 Len Scales, The Shaping of German Identity: Authority and Crisis, 1245-1414 (Cambridge 2012); Joachim 
Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire, 1493-1806, 2 vols (Oxford 2012); Peter H. Wilson, The Holy 
Roman Empire: A Thousand Years of Europe’s History (London, 2016). 
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many French writers of the eighteenth century who rather admired the German empire as a 
kind of republic or limited monarchy.5 
Yet Voltaire’s characterisation of the empire later became popular because it could be cited, 
albeit wrongly, in support of the negative views that developed soon after its demise. For 
much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the early modern empire’s reputation was 
poor. Some nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century German and Austrian historians 
despised it for not being a nation state and blamed it for delaying the development of the 
Germans. They often praised the territories for their cultural achievements but refused to 
recognise the ways in which the empire made them possible. Critics of Germany before and 
after 1945 often sought to establish the continuity from first Reich to Third Reich, which cast 
sombre shadows over the centuries before 1806.6  
The views of scholars working outside Germany generally reflected those of their German-
speaking colleagues, though the tone was often influenced by concerns about the growing 
power of the new Germany after 1871 or, later, by Nazism and the Third Reich and the 
aftermath of the Holocaust and the Second World War. Even the fundamentally pro-German 
James Bryce constructed a narrative that was not so different structurally. He was interested 
in the potential of the empire for the exercise of supranational authority. His history of the 
empire, first published in 1864 and still in print today, made it clear, however, that it failed in 
this mission.7  
From around 1500 at the latest, Bryce argued, the empire had simply become a German 
kingdom. This created the framework for a remarkable diversity of culture, but the empire’s 
international mission was gone. In Germany itself, the Reformation brought bitter internal 
divisions and ‘while the princes became shamelessly selfish, justifying their resistance to the 
throne as the defence of their own liberty—liberty to oppress the subject—and ready on the 
least occasion to throw themselves into the arms of France, the body of the people were 
deprived of all political training, and have found the lack of such experience impede their 
efforts to our own time’.8 The Germans, he concluded, now live ‘submissive to paternal 
government, and given to the quiet enjoyments of art, music, and meditation, they delight 
themselves with memories of the time when their conquering chivalry was the terror of the 
Gaul and the Slav, the Lombard and the Saracen’. 9 
Others were less charitable. The US literary and cultural historian Edwin Hermann Zeydel 
wrote in 1918 that the empire ‘had no history at all’ after 1648 and that ‘it continued for a 
                                                          
5 Voltaire,  Essai sur les moeurs et l’esprit des nations, ed. Bruno Bernard et al., Les oeuvres completes de 
Voltaire vol. 24 (Oxford, 2011), p. 41. See also Guido Braun, La connaissance du Saint-Empire en France 
1643-1756 (Munich, 2010), pp. 584-7. 
6 A good overview of the historiography can be found in Matthias Schnettger (ed.), Imperium Romanum – 
Irregulare corpus – Teutscher Reichs-Staat. Das Alte Reich im Verständnis der Zeitgenossen und der 
Historiographie (Mainz, 2003). 
7 John T. Seaman, Jr., A Citizen of the World. The Life of James Bryce (London, 2006), pp. 41-4, 128-30; 
Thomas Kleinknecht, Imperiale und internationale Ordnung., Eine Untersuchung zum anglo-amerikanischen 
Gelehrtenliberalismus am Beispiel von James Bryce (1838-1922) (Göttingen, 1985), pp. 71-114 
8 James Bryce, The Holy Roman Empire, 6th edn (London, 1922), p. 425. 
9 Ibid.   
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while longer to lead a miserable, meaningless existence because its patient, slow-moving 
subjects lacked the initiative and in many cases the intelligence to effect its actual 
dissolution’.10 
After 1914-18 developments in Germany prompted much more urgent and more negative 
views. In France Edmond Vermeil devoted himself from the later 1920s to warning the 
French public of the danger posed by Hitler and Nazism, eventually placing contemporary 
events in historical perspective in his Germany’s Three Reichs: Their History and Culture.11 
In the US, William Montgomery McGovern’s From Luther to Hitler: The History of Fascist-
Nazi Political Philosophy of 1941 undertook a similar task.12 In the UK the most notable and 
successful work of this kind was A.J.P. Taylor’s The Course of German History of 1945, 
which argued that the whole of German history predisposed the Germans to Nazism and that 
Hitler fulfilled the imperialist fantasies that had gripped the Germans since the days of 
Charlemagne.13 
After 1945 the scholarly view of the Holy Roman Empire gradually changed. On the one 
hand the interpretative framework within which historians worked remained unfavourable to 
the development of significant popular interest in the empire. The most widely read history of 
Germany to the 1980s was Johannes Haller’s Epochen der deutschen Geschichte.14 First 
published in 1923, Haller frequently adapted, updated and amended his text until his death in 
1947; others took on that task thereafter and perpetuated Haller’s narrative of decline from 
promising early medieval foundations.  
Alongside this evergreen ‘classic’, and others like it, the new master narrative of modern 
German history was now generally written as a negative Sonderweg rather than as a positive 
‘besonderer deutscher Weg’ or German destiny.15 The empire served as a rather dismal 
backdrop to the developments of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century. It was 
still viewed essentially as an entity that had failed to become a state. Its medieval period was 
held to have ended in chaos in the thirteenth century. Its early modern period was 
characterised by religious division, fragmentation, civil war and foreign domination. Nothing 
in its thousand-year history, it was held, had prepared the Germans for the modern world. 
Precisely because the Germans had no long pre-history of nationhood, statehood, or 
democratic struggle, so the argument generally continued, they plunged themselves willingly 
into the disasters of German nationhood and statehood that unfolded after 1871. The 
                                                          
10 Edwin Hermann Zeydel, The Holy Roman Empire in German Literature (New York, 1918), 15. The book was 
republished in 1966 and 2009. 
11 Edmond Vermeil, Germany’s Three Reichs: Their History and Culture (London, 1944). 
12 William Montgomery McGovern, From Luther to Hitler: the History of Fascist-Nazi Political Philosophy 
(New York, 1941, the UK edn London, 1946). 
13 A.J.P. Taylor, The Course of German History: A Survey of the Development of Germany since 1815 (London, 
1945), pp. 13-33. 
14 Benjamin Hasselhorn, Johannes Haller: Eine politische Gelehrtenbiographie: mit einer Edition des 
unveröffentlichten Teils der Lebenserinnerungen Johannes Hallers (Göttingen, 2015), pp. 166-82. 
15 Bernd Faulenbach, Ideologie des deutschen Weges: die deutsche Geschichte in der Historiographie zwischen 
Kaiserreich und Nationalsozialismus (Munich, 1980); Dieter Langewiesche, ‘Der “deutsche Sonderweg”. 
Defizitgeschichte  als als geschichtspolitische Zukunftskonstruktion nach dem Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg’, 
in idem, Zeitwende: Geschichtsdenken heute, ed. Ute Planert and Nikolaus Buschmann (Göttingen, 2008), pp. 
164-71. 
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Sonderweg myths developed by historians of the modern period cast shadows over the whole 
of German history. 
On the other hand, at the level of scholarly research, new approaches also gradually 
developed which ultimately resulted in the new views of the empire that are prevalent today. 
Perhaps inevitably the empire’s sheer longevity impeded the emergence of any overall view. 
Research activity was organised either around chairs of medieval history or around chairs of 
early modern history. For a long time there was little dialogue between the two areas of 
study. It was only in the 1970s that scholars such as Peter Moraw began to illuminate the 
transition from the late Middle Ages to the early modern period, though the initial result of 
that was simply that the later medieval period became ‘reassigned’ to the early modern 
period. More recently, historians of the early modern empire who advocate a new ‘cultural’ 
approach have taken forward ideas originally developed by medieval historians. But for many 
decades scholars in the two periods worked quite independently of each other and developed 
very different research agendas. 
THE MEDIEVAL EMPIRE 
For medievalists, whose discipline took shape in the shadow of the Wars of Liberation and 
the subsequent re-constituting of the old order, Germany’s medieval Reich was a central 
concern from the start. Reflecting on the origins and early history of the Empire was 
inseparable from the rise of bourgeois German nationalism and from hopes for, and debate 
about the proper form of, a future German nation-state. The so-called deutsche Kaiserzeit 
(‘German imperial age’) between the tenth and the thirteenth centuries seemed to nineteenth-
century eyes to offer visions of German power, unity, and prestige without subsequent 
parallel. Already in the tenth century, as it seemed, the German people had been unified in a 
strong monarchical state, under the Ottonian emperors, which commanded a hegemonic 
position in central Europe.16 To advocates of German political unity, and to defenders of the 
new Reich established in 1871, the high-medieval Empire was both precedent and template. 
 
Yet it also appeared to contain a warning, since the Empire’s apparent medieval trajectory, 
from precocious early strength via successive crises and fatal ‘wrong turnings’ to 
fragmentation and impotence, had plotted an opposite course from neighbouring western 
realms. This encouraged German medievalists to seek out the historic saboteurs, internal and 
external, of their people’s predestined but too-briefly-attained unity and greatness: self-
seeking princes at home, treacherous popes and jealous neighbours abroad. It also stimulated 
them to scrutinize the actions of the emperors, and to judge how far these had contributed to, 
or served to undermine, that same lost unity and greatness. These concerns were crystallized 
in the dispute waged, around the time of the creation of the Bismarckian Reich, by Heinrich 
von Sybel and Julius Ficker.17 The positions which von Sybel and Ficker adopted, labelled 
                                                          
16 A classic statement is Wilhelm von Giesebrecht, Geschichte der deutschen Kaiserzeit, vol. I (Braunschweig, 
1855). 
17 For what follows, see Fedor Schneider (ed.), Universalstaat oder Nationalstaat: Macht und Ende des Ersten 
deutschen Reiches (Die Streitschriften von Heinrich v. Sybel und Julius Ficker zur deutschen Kaiserpolitik des 
Mittelalters), 2nd edn (Innsbruck, 1943). 
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respectively kleindeutsch and großdeutsch (‘small-German’ and ‘great-German’), embodied 
contradictory judgments on the behaviour of medieval emperors, supporting rival blueprints 
for a future German state. For the kleindeutsch party, the imperial pretensions of the medieval 
German monarchy, and particularly its ventures south of the Alps, had fatally distracted its 
bearers from the proper task of national unification. Advocates of the ‘great-German’ 
position, generally Catholic and sympathetic to Habsburg Austria, saw less of a contradiction 
between German state-building and Christian-Roman imperialism. After the founding of the 
Hohenzollern Kaiserreich, a further position, sometimes termed (from its supposed high-
medieval source) Ghibellinism, became established, combining the anti-Catholic and pro-
Prussian leanings of the kleindeutsch school with a großdeutsch glorification of medieval 
(and contemporary) German imperialism.18 
 
The circumstances under which the first modern histories of the medieval Empire came to be 
written endowed them with distinctive qualities, most of which endured in subsequent 
German retellings, although with some variations and changes of emphasis, until at least the 
middle of the twentieth century.19 They were histories of power and of its eventual failure. 
Their heroes were those emperors who seemed to do most to strengthen the resources of 
monarchical rule – of the Zentralgewalt (‘power at the centre’). The historian’s disapproval 
was reserved for those kings and emperors who appeared not to prioritize the accumulation of 
power in Germany. Medieval monarchs tended to be envisaged as thinking, calculating, and 
acting in the manner of contemporary statesmen (or chided for failing to do so), with their 
natural goal the development of structures of law and coercion to foreshadow the modern 
state. Emperors and their opponents were viewed as acting on the basis of clear ideological 
positions (which they defended by the organized deployment of ‘propaganda’), or – as in 
Frederick Barbarossa’s supposedly fateful clash with the Saxon duke Henry the Lion – as the 
representatives of distinct, rival dynasties, set on unavoidable collision-courses. That the 
Empire was the political manifestation of the German Volk, to which through its 
establishment it gave lasting form, and whose character and political entitlements it 
embodied, was more assumed than examined. The glory of its rulers was that of the German 
people, the fading of that glory a historic mark of shame that it fell to their modern 
descendants to redeem. For this reason, the Empire’s history in the later Middle Ages, when 
its rulers seemed to cut less heroic figures and government in Germany largely to have passed 
into the hands of (‘particularist’) regional and local powers, was comparatively neglected. 
 
Already during the interwar period, this modern history of medieval power-politics began to 
be qualified by less anachronistic views, and its unreflective positivism to yield to more 
sympathetic engagement with the medieval sources. Studies of the mental horizons and 
iconography of emperorship, by Ernst Kantorowicz and Percy Ernst Schramm, represented 
                                                          
18 For views on the Empire at this time, se Elisabeth Fehrenbach, Wandlungen des deutschen Kaisergedankens 
(1871-1918) (Munich, 1969). 
19 See generally Gerd Althoff, ‘Das Mittelalterbild der Deutschen vor und nach 1945’, in Paul-Joachim Heinig 
et al. (eds.), Reich, Regionen und Europa im Mittelalter und Neuzeit: Festschrift für Peter Moraw (Berlin, 
2000), pp. 731-49. A good impression of the flavour of this work can be gained from the essays translated into 
English in Geoffrey Barraclough (ed.), Medieval Germany 911-1250, vol. II (Oxford, 1938), representing the 
state of play in Germany in the early 1930s. 
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attempts at understanding the imperial monarchy as contemporaries saw it.20 A major shift in 
perspectives was initiated during the 1930s by a group of scholars, of whom the most 
influential was Otto Brunner, who launched an all-out assault on traditional, state-centred 
constitutional history. Instead of looking for proto-modern structures they claimed to detect 
the continued working of ancient Germanic practices, and in place of abstract doctrines they 
emphasized the personal bonds between lord and man. Although Brunner showed relatively 
little interest in the Empire, his holistic, primitivist vision of German political culture was to 
exercise an important, if often indirect, influence on its postwar study. It was also, however, 
to prove controversial. Brunner was a card-carrying National Socialist (as were other 
members of the group, such as Theodor Mayer and Walter Schlesinger), and his seminal 
study of late-medieval Austria, Land und Herrschaft (‘Land and Lordship’, first edition 
1939), adopted the vocabulary – and, arguably, projected into the past the political values – of 
the regime.21 
 
Although the events of 1945 and what followed brought to German studies of the Empire a 
breach with the past both deep and enduring, its comprehensiveness can be overstated. By 
that date, some of the ground was already prepared for the new approaches and foci that 
would gradually gain ground, while older ways of thinking proved tenacious, particularly in 
the first two postwar decades. In the DDR, a quest for the origins of the medieval German 
nation-state was perpetuated for a time, kept alive by Marxist-Leninist doctrine, which 
required state structures within which class-formation could occur.22 Although this approach 
was never entirely abandoned, by the 1970s it had matured into studies of the evolving 
conceptual vocabularies of medieval imperial rule, richer and more nuanced, but also less 
obviously attuned to official goals, than earlier work.23 In the postwar Federal Republic, 
attention shifted for a time away from the high-medieval Empire and its ‘German’ rulers to 
the preceding Frankish era.24 Although the celebration of ‘the West’ and of the origins of 
‘Europe’, which the new focus served, was itself far from new, the shift of chronological 
perspective was to prove important to late twentieth-century judgments on the Empire’s 
character and development. An important element of continuity was the ongoing work of 
major source-editing projects, with their origins in the nineteenth century: Regesta Imperii, 
                                                          
20 Ernst Kantorowicz, Kaiser Friedrich der Zweite (Berlin, 1927); Percy Ernst Schramm, Kaiser, Rom und 
Renovatio: Studien und Texte zur Geschichte des römischen Erneuerungsgedankens vom Ende des 
karolingischen Reiches bis zum Investiturstreit, 2 vols (Leipzig, 1929). 
21 Otto Brunner, Land und Herrschaft: Grundfragen der territorialen Verfassungsgeschichte 
Südostdeutschlands im Mittelalter (Baden bei Wien, 1939). Postwar editions excised much of the Nazi 
terminology. For the ideological context, see James van Horn Melton, ‘From folk history to structural history: 
Otto Brunner (1898-1982) and the radical-conservative roots of German social history’, in Hartmut Lehmann 
and James van Horn Melton (eds.), Paths of Continuity: Central European Historiography from the 1930s to the 
1950s (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 263-97. 
22 Thus Eckhard Müller-Mertens, Das Zeitalter der Ottonen: Kurzer Abriß der politischen Geschichte 
Deutschlands im 10. Jahrhundert (Berlin, 1955); and see Michael Borgolte, ‘Anfänge deutscher Geschichte? 
Die Mittelalterforschung der zweiten Nachkriegszeit’, Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte 25 (1996), 
35-53 (here 41). 
23 Eckhard Müller-Mertens, Regnum Teutonicum: Aufkommen und Verbreitung der deutschen Reichs- und 
Königsauffassung im frühen Mittelalter (Vienna, Cologne and Graz, 1970); Gottfried Koch, Auf dem Wege zum 
Sacrum Imperium: Studien zur ideologischen Herrschaftsbegründung der deutschen Zentralgewalt im 11. und 
12. Jahrhundert (Vienna, Cologne, and Graz, 1972). 
24 For what follows, see Borgolte, ‘Anfänge deutscher Geschichte?‘, 44-5, 48. 
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the Reichstagsakten, and the various series of the Monumenta Germaniae Historica. To a 
degree, these still dictated the rhythms of scholarship more broadly: the publication of 
Barbarossa’s diplomata by the MGH during the final quarter of the twentieth century, for 
example, would stimulate a flurry of new monographs on the emperor. 
 
It is particularly in studies of the Empire’s early-medieval history, and of its first foundations 
in the lands east of the Rhine, that the reader sees how far perspectives had moved, when 
interest in the topic picked up in the 1970s and 1980s. A lecture by Carlrichard Brühl at the 
German Historical Institute in Paris in 1971, entitled ‘The Origins of German History?’, 
pointed the way toward what would become a fundamental reassessment of some old-
established articles of faith. The following year saw the establishment of the ‘Marburg 
group’, whose Nationes-project sought to trace ‘the emergence of European nations in the 
Middle Ages’.25 The project’s underlying premise, that nations and peoples are cultural 
constructs, the products of history rather than its building blocks, today seems banal. But at 
the time it posed a challenge to some familiar assumptions about the historical relationship 
between the Empire and the Germans. The challenge gained added force from an aspect of 
the Nationes group’s approach that also discloses a wider trend among German medievalists 
at the time: a new openness to the perspectives of non-German scholars. The parochialism 
that had characterized German writing on the Empire for more than a century, along with 
many of the notions that it sustained, was breaking down. The new currents and the 
conclusions to which they pointed found trenchant expression in Brühl’s monumental study 
of the ‘birth’ of the German and French peoples, published in 1990.26 There, Brühl not only 
traced a common origin for the imperial and French monarchies in the Carolingian empire, 
but underlined their early history of relatively peaceful coexistence and sought to show that a 
‘German’ identity had developed within the East-Frankish realm only at a considerably later 
date than was widely claimed. Traditional images of German exceptionalism, political 
precocity, and imperial self-assertion were replaced by visions of things shared across the 
western frontier and of a post-Carolingian Empire that for a long time was hardly ‘German’ 
at all. 
 
The medieval imperial monarchy, as studies since the late twentieth century increasingly 
showed, had never been the powerful and domineering institution of former fantasy. Indeed, 
it was scarcely an institution at all. Gerd Althoff was making a point in subtitling his 
introductory history of the Ottonians ‘royal rule without a State’.27 Earlier depictions of the 
imperial court as a centre of co-ordinated ‘propaganda’ have likewise given way to more 
cautious and sceptical judgments. For Peter Godman, for example, the Archpoet was only the 
                                                          
25 For Nationes, see the end-of-project report by Helmut Beumann, ‘Europäische Nationenbildung im 
Mittlelalter: Aus der Bilanz eines Forschungsschwerpunktes’, Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 39 
(1988), 587-93. 
26 Carlrichard Brühl, Deutschland – Frankreich: Die Geburt zweier Völker (Cologne and Vienna, 1990). For the 
debate sparked by Brühl’s book, see Carlrichard Brühl and Bernd Schneidmüller (eds.), Beiträge zur 
mittelalterlichen Reichs- und Nationsbildung in Deutschland und Frankreich (HZ Beiheft 24, Munich, 1997). 
27 Gerd Althoff, Die Ottonen: Königsherrschaft ohne Staat (Stuttgart, 2000). 
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most foot-dragging of panegyricists for Barbarossa.28 A recent study of visual representations 
of the same monarch emphasizes, against earlier assumptions, the impossibility of anything 
approaching a co-ordinated ‘image-making’ programme being staged for an itinerant high-
medieval emperor.29 A large-scale Barbarossa-biography by John B. Freed depicts an 
illiterate aristocratic warlord, ill-prepared by background even to grasp the claims made in his 
name, let alone formulate the ‘policies’ with which he was once credited.30 While Freed’s 
position is extreme, his stress upon the emperor’s limited agency reflects recent trends. So, 
too, does the demythologizing intent: in an earlier study of Barbarossa’s grandson Frederick 
II, David Abulafia took a similar course, insisting that there was little to distinguish the 
putative stupor mundi from other rulers of his day.31 
 
Not only did emperors lack the means to accumulate power at the ‘centre’; recent studies 
have insisted that it never occurred to them to do so. Much attention has here been devoted to 
the personal interactions of the Empire’s secular and spiritual elites and – in Althoff’s 
celebrated formulation – to the (unwritten) ‘rules of the game’ by which these occurred.32 
Bernd Schneidmüller has written of the ‘consensual’ character of imperial rule, which did not 
seek opportunities to engage in power-struggles with other princes.33 Knut Görich, in tracing 
the importance of honour as a political currency, likewise emphasizes the face-to-face nature 
of high politics and the mutuality of respect which it presupposed.34 In particular, recent 
decades have brought a burgeoning interest in the role of ritual as what Timothy Reuter 
called a ‘meta-language’ of imperial politics.35 Again, this is a field where German scholars 
have led the way, often working within major funded projects, and again the result has been 
to distance the Empire from post-Enlightenment conceptions of the ‘political’. This tendency 
is starkly illustrated in an essay-collection published in 2009 on the Golden Bull of 1356 – a 
constitutional document once viewed as so fundamental that eighteenth-century 
commentators devoted thousands of pages to glossing its contents.36 The 2009 authors, by 
contrast, found remarkably little to say about the text of the Bull, instead concentrating 
heavily on its relevance to the visual ‘staging’ of emperorship. Ludger Körntgen, in a study 
of Ottonian ritual and memoria, has gone even further, questioning how far his material can 
be understood as political at all.37 
                                                          
28 Peter Godman, ‘The Archpoet and the emperor’, Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 76 (2011), 
31-58. 
29 Knut Görich, ‘BarbarossaBilder – Befunde und Probleme’, in Knut Görich and Romedio Schmitz-Esser 
(eds.), Barbarossabilder: Entstehungskontexte, Erwartungshorizonte, Verwendungszusammenhänge 
(Regensburg, 2014), pp. 9-29. 
30 John B. Freed, Frederick Barbarossa: The Prince and the Myth (New Haven, 2016). 
31 David Abulafia, Frederick II: A medieval Emperor (London, 1988). 
32 Gerd Althoff, Spielregeln der Politik im Mittelalter: Kommunikation in Frieden und Fehde (Darmstadt, 
1997). 
33 Bernd Schneidmüller, ‘Consensuale Herrschaft: Ein Essay über Formen und Konzepte politischer Ordnung im 
Mittelalter‘, in Heinig et al. (eds.), Reich, Regionen und Europa, pp. 53-87. 
34 Knut Görich, Die Ehre Friedrich Barbarossas: Kommunikation, Konflikt und politisches Handeln im 12. 
Jahrhundert (Darmstadt, 2001). 
35 Timothy Reuter, Medieval Polities and Modern Mentalities, ed. Janet L. Nelson (Cambridge, 2006), p. 169. 
36 Ulrike Hohensee et al. (eds.), Die Goldene Bulle: Politik – Wahrnehmung – Rezeption, 2 vols. (Berlin, 2009). 
37 Ludger Körntgen, Königsherrschaft und Gottes Gnade. Zu Kontext und Funktion sakraler Vorstellungen in 
Historiographie und Bildzeugnissen der ottonisch-frühsalischen Zeit (Berlin, 2001). 
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Important in changing perspectives has been the sophistication which historians have recently 
brought to reading the sources, often informed by literary theory. The result has been to 
emphasize how little can be said with confidence about medieval political actors. Indeed, the 
recent preoccupation with ritual has itself been criticized on those grounds.38 Alertness to the 
limits of the knowable is evident, for example, in Althoff’s biography of Otto III, where the 
emperor himself retreats behind the sources.39  Particularly important has been Johannes 
Fried’s argument, informed by neurological science, for the difficulty of historians 
penetrating beyond the ‘veil of memory’ created by medieval writers, and his prescriptions 
for how this might nevertheless be attempted. This has led Fried – although without fully 
convincing others – to question some of the notorious ‘turning points’ once held to have 
shaped the Empire’s history.40 The trend has been towards deconstruction. Even the warring 
dynasties that once bestrode the stage have largely dissolved in the face of closer critical 
scrutiny, which has shown their apparently solid substance mostly to be a construct of later 
sources.41 
 
A new scepticism about aspects of the traditional narrative, combined with a more realistic 
estimation of the capabilities and intentions of the imperial monarchy even in its supposed 
high-medieval heyday, has done much to disrupt familiar views of the shape of the Empire’s 
history across the Middle Ages. The early peaks now seem less soaring, or simply less 
discernible through the fog of the sources. Also important, however, has been the closer and 
more sympathetic engagement with the later medieval period in recent work. Here too, the 
1970s and 1980s were axial. The outstanding figure is Peter Moraw, whose studies have 
transformed understanding of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Although Moraw had 
much to say about the working of imperial government, he approached it in terms not 
primarily of institutions but of complex networks of personal relationships, underpinned by 
bonds of patronage and dependence. The zonal model which he formulated for evaluating the 
extent of imperial power in different regions – some ‘close to the monarch’ (königsnah), 
others ‘open’ to him, still others ‘remote’ – has proved flexible enough to show how patterns 
of control and influence changed between dynasties and reigns.42 It allowed him to trace a 
picture of the imperial monarchy’s relations with its subject territories more nuanced than 
older visions of collapse and impotence. 
 
Political changes in the late twentieth century also contributed to the greater attention given 
to the late Middle Ages. The fall of the Iron Curtain, which brought new vitality to research 
on the Empire generally, fostered particularly the study of a period in which the emperors – 
                                                          
38 Philippe Buc, The Dangers of Ritual: Between Early Medieval Texts and Social Scientific Theory (Princeton, 
2001). 
39 Gerd Althoff, Otto III (Darmstadt, 1996). 
40 Johannes Fried, The Veil of Memory: Anthropological Problems when considering the Past (London, 1998); 
idem, Canossa: Entlarvung einer Legende: Eine Streitschrift (Berlin, 2012). 
41 Werner Hechberger, Staufer und Welfen 1125-1190: Zur Verwendung von Theorien in der 
Geschichtswissenschaft (Cologne, Weimar, and Vienna, 1996). 
42 Peter Moraw, Von offener Verfassung zu gestalteter Verdichtung: Das Reich im späten Mittelalter 1250 bis 
1490 (Berlin, 1985), p. 175. 
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most conspicuously, those of the Luxemburg dynasty – ruled over imperial and dynastic 
lands on both sides of the Cold-War frontier. The reign of Sigismund (r. 1410/11-1437), 
whose field of activity was especially broad, has recently received close attention from a 
trans-Danubian network of researchers.43 More fundamentally, the late-medieval Empire 
appealed to postwar generations of scholars, for whom its rulers’ relative avoidance of 
military adventures and the composite, polycentric character of their realm now appeared 
admirable rather than lamentable. Charles IV (r. 1346-1378) in particular was celebrated from 
late twentieth-century perspectives as a consummate diplomat and master of the ‘art of the 
possible’.44 Only in more recent work has the emphasis turned to understanding him as a 
product of the values of his own day.45  
THE EARLY MODERN EMPIRE 
As in the case of medieval studies, research into early modern German history unfolded 
differently in the GDR and the FRG. While there came to be some dialogue between 
historians on either side of the Berlin Wall in the 1970s, especially in Reformation studies, 
they tended to operate in quite separate historiographical frameworks. 
In East Germany the materialist conception of history was initially pursued in the framework 
of the ‘two paths theory’ that traced the interaction between a progressive path and a 
reactionary path in German history. The triumph of the ‘anti-national class of the German 
territorial princes’, the establishment of the repressive absolutist state and the emergence of 
Brandenburg-Prussia characterised the reactionary path in the early modern period. The 
progressive path comprised the ‘early bourgeois revolution’ and the failed revolutionary mass 
movement of 1525. The redefinition of the paths as ‘heritage’ (reactionary) and ‘tradition’ 
(progressive) in the 1970s led to the development of a more inclusive approach, which saw 
the publication of more positive books on Luther and Frederick the Great. Yet the early 
modern period was still seen as one in which the development of German history was 
truncated in 1525 with the triumph of reactionary forces over the popular mass movement. As 
Germany was cast into darkness, the revolutionary impetus passed to the Netherlands and 
England. 
Scholarship on the early modern empire in western Germany after 1945 was shaped initially 
by two distinct considerations. Firstly, the leading German early modernists seem to have 
taken to heart the suggestion made by Peter Rassow in 1946 that they must subscribe to the 
motto: ‘Fort aus der deutschen und hinein in die europäische Geschichte’ (‘Out of German 
history and into European history’).46 The old national history should be abandoned and 
German history should henceforth be written as European history. Many now took up the 
                                                          
43 Thus, e.g., Karel Hruza and Alexandra Kaar (eds.), Kaiser Sigismund (1368-1437): Zur Herrschaftspraxis 
eines europäischen Monarchen (Cologne, Weimar, and Vienna, 2012). 
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theme of Europe or ‘the West’ (das Abendland). While work on Prussia, for example by 
Gerhard Ritter, did not cease and exponents of Landesgesgeschichte continued to plough the 
old furrows, the perspective as a whole changed. 
Secondly, work on the early modern empire was stimulated by the renewed interest in it of 
many Catholic Germans. On the one hand they were attracted by the corporatist social 
structure of the empire, which seemed to provide inspiration for a generation that was 
struggling to recover from the breakdown of democracy in the inter-war period. On the other 
hand, they were attracted to the idea of the empire because it represented an alternative to the 
Prussian-German tradition of the nation state. Federalism seemed preferable to unitarism. 
Traditions of diversity, peaceful integration and commitment to a higher moral law were 
preferable to the nightmare of Prussian militarism. There was a tendency to turn away from 
the idea that the empire should be regarded as a nation or as a state. It was, according to the 
new view, supranational and European. Resuming its traditions now meant a commitment to 
federalism and to Europe. In 1959, Paul Wilhelm Wenger, the editor of the Rheinischer 
Merkur, even wrote that Germany and Europe were living through the new ‘translatio imperii 
ad Europam foederatam’ (the translation of the Empire into a European federation).47 
While these ideas were initially developed by Catholic conservatives at a time when the SPD 
was still committed to speedy German unification, they gradually gained wider acceptance. 
They laid the foundations for the post-national thinking that became characteristic of the 
liberal left in the Federal Republic before 1990. Figures such as Dolf Sternberger and Jürgen 
Habermas propagated the view that West Germany was a progressive post-national 
democracy surrounded by nation states that had not yet progressed into the post-national era. 
Some went so far as to turn the Sonderweg into an advantage: Germany’s disastrous national 
history predestined her to be a forerunner of the new post-national European order; the 
Germans would lead the way into the future because they had learned the lessons of history 
and because there was no way back, indeed should be no way back, to the national past. The 
strength of that post-national feeling is underlined by the pronounced reticence of FRG 
historians, and not just historians of early modern Germany, in response to unification in 
1990.48 
The real post-1945 pioneers in historical scholarship on the early modern Holy Roman 
Empire also tended to be Catholics, from the Rhineland, Bavaria or Austria; the names of 
Konrad Repgen, Heinrich Lutz and Karl Otmar von Aretin spring to mind most readily. The 
outcome of their work on Charles V (Lutz), the Thirty Years’ War and the Peace of 
Westphalia (Repgen) and the empire in the eighteenth century (von Aretin) was to foster a 
                                                          
47 Joachim Whaley, ‘Federal Habits: The Holy Roman Empire and the Continuity of German Federalism’, in 
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much more positive view of the empire.49 While still committed to the belief that it had no 
future and that its demise was inevitable, they revealed a polity which seemed to function 
well and which endured far longer than any subsequent German polity.  
These historians put a new emphasis on the distinctive character of the empire’s early modern 
history. They no longer viewed it as a protracted period of steady decline punctuated by 
spectacular episodes of failure. They still clung, as indeed German early modernists generally 
still do today, to the idea that its failure was inevitable. But they view the centuries before 
that as a period characterised by constitutional innovation and by the emergence of the 
empire by 1648 as a Rechts-, Verteidigungs-, und Friedensordnung. The empire’s very 
existence guaranteed the peace and stability of Europe as a whole. One of its main functions 
was to organise the collective defence of its members against foreign attack, though it could 
not itself wage unprovoked war on any external power or territory. At the same time it 
devised mechanisms which served to defend the existence and rights of all of its members 
against aggression from other members and to maintain the peace. Moreover the empire’s 
institutions, in particular the Reichskammergericht and the Reichshofrat, guaranteed the 
rights not only of territorial rulers and urban magistrates but also of the inhabitants of 
territories and cities against their rulers. The empire saw the development of a legal culture 
that had no parallel in Europe and the ‘juridifcation’ of social and political conflict marked 
the German territories out from neighbouring countries. 
On the basis of these kinds of interpretations the affinities between the empire (or the ‘Old 
Empire’, as the early modern empire was frequently called) and the modern European Union 
seemed striking. Some scholars, notably perhaps Peter C. Hartmann, were fascinated by the 
thought that the institutions of the empire prefigured those of the modern European Union.50 
Hartmann suggested in 1993 that the empire was a ‘Mitteleuropa of the regions’, that its 
defensive system resembled NATO and that the multi-confessional, multi-ethnic and multi-
cultural empire with its multiple levels of government (imperial diet, regional imperial 
circles, territories and cities) and the practice of subsidiarity made it a perfect model for the 
future.  
With their emphasis on the pre-national character of the empire, Hartmann’s ideas, shared to 
varying degrees by many other German historians, were in tune with the broad consensus that 
the empire was not a state and that it certainly was not a nation state.51 The strength of such 
views was revealed by the controversy which followed the publication of the Jena historian 
Georg Schmidt’s survey of early modern German history in 1999.52 Schmidt argued that the 
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50 See Whaley, ‘Old Reich’, 35-6 
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old empire was both a state and the framework within which a German nation existed in the 
early modern period. According to him, 1495 marked the beginning of German 
Gesamtstaatlichkeit, the union of the Germans in a single overarching state organisation. This 
polity was what Schmidt calls ‘der komplementäre Reichs-Staat’, a system which operated at 
various inter-locking levels from Imperial, to regional, to local. This was no state in the 
Hegelian sense but it was similar to the early modern composite monarchies in France, Great 
Britain or Spain. The foundations laid in 1495 were further developed in 1555 and completed 
in 1648 following the Thirty Years’ War which is seen primarily as a conflict over the 
German constitution, the defence of German liberty against Ferdinand II’s attempt to 
establish a strong monarchy. Schmidt’s work emphasised the modernity of the empire and of 
the legal principles relating to individual liberties developed in it and the ‘normality’ of the 
development of German national identity in the early modern period. 
Around the same time the Augsburg scholar Johannes Burkhardt put forward a similarly 
provocative view of the Peace of Westphalia as the Gesamtstaatsverfassung of the German 
polity. He argued furthermore that 1648 ended religious conflict in the empire and marked 
the beginning of modern religious toleration, that the empire after 1648 was a federal 
Rechtsstaat and that the permanent diet from 1653 was Europe’s first real parliament. He has 
subsequently developed these ideas further in a Gebhardt handbook and an outline of early 
modern German history.53  
The response to both scholars was vociferous. Heinz Schilling and Wolfgang Reinhard led 
the charge against Schmidt’s arguments, particularly against his suggestion that the empire be 
termed the ‘Reichs-Staat’, a term that at least had the merit of being an authentic early 
modern epithet. Schilling insisted that his own label ‘teilmodernisiertes Reichsystem’ 
(partially modernised imperial system) was more accurate.54 Reinhard insisted on ‘neuartiges 
zweistöckiges Herrschaftssytem’ (a novel form of two-tier system of governmemt). In the 
same year as Schmidt’s book appeared Bernd Marquardt suggested in a similar vein that the 
empire had been a ‘segmentäres Verfassungssystem’ (a segmented constitutional system) 
comprising ‘10,000 lokale Herrschaften’ (10,000 local jurisdictions).55 The chorus of 
criticism of both Schmidt and Burkhardt broadly rejected the idea that the empire was a state, 
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that 1648 could be viewed as a German constitution, or that the empire was in any sense a 
nation state with which the Germans as a nation identified. 
The debate was about more than scholarship. Schilling, for example, suggested that Schmidt 
had been overcome by a kind of unification euphoria. Reinhard argued that eulogising the 
‘Reichs-Staat’ was tantamount to legitimating the Berlin Republic. Paul Münch asserted that 
comparing 1648 with 1848, as Burkhardt had done, as a milestone in the democratic history 
of Germany, made Auschwitz (in a country with three centuries of Rechtsstaatlichkeit behind 
it rather than a new, ‘delayed’ nation created by Prussian conquest in 1871) an even greater 
ignominy.56 In the midst of the debate Winfried Schulze attempted to mediate with an 
overview that sought to reconcile and combine the views of Schmidt and Schilling in a 
positive view of the old empire while still perceiving Germany to have deviated from 
Western Europe in the ideological, cultural, political and military confrontation with France 
between 1789 and 1815 and in the dominance of Prussia in Germany after 1850.57 
In the fifteen years since the controversy, Schmidt has developed his views further and the 
ideas set out in his book have stimulated, whether explicitly acknowledged or not, a 
significant amount of new work on the early modern empire. Schmidt has continued to 
develop the theme of German liberty as a key to the understanding of the old empire and its 
position in German history.58 The early modern nation has also continued to figure centrally 
in his work.59 And he has continued to develop his views on the significance of the history of 
the old empire for Europe in the twenty-first century, combining his insistence on the 
existence of an early modern nation with a view of the ways in which the structures of the old 
empire can provide inspiration for the future.60 Others, for example Alexander Schmidt, 
Martin Wrede, Horst Dreitzel or Caspar Hirschi, have taken up the theme of the German 
nation and national sentiment in the early modern period.61 A wealth of research on imperial 
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institutions, some undertaken by Schmidt’s students, some developed in parallel and with 
roots that predate the publication of Schmidt’s 1999 history, has also appeared in the last two 
decades. This includes important work on the imperial circles (Wolfgang Wüst), the supreme 
courts (the major German and Austrian state-funded projects still in progress devoted to the 
papers of the Reichshofrat and the Reichskammergericht), and the imperial diet (Anton 
Schindling, Karl Härter, Michael Rohrschneider and others).62 Much of this provides an 
extensive literature which at the very least does not contradict Schmidt’s views, even if not 
all of its authors are willing to agree with him explicitly. 
Meanwhile a new approach to the history of the old empire has emerged which might be seen 
as a response to ideas of its modernity or at least to the view that it experienced 
modernisation in the early modern period. Generally billed as a new cultural history 
approach, exponents of this view build on the work of medievalists such as Gerd Althoff and 
have explored the modes of symbolic communication which characterised the empire. They 
are interested in the performance of power relations. Their work is in opposition to those who 
emphasise the new structures developed in the empire from 1495 since they emphasise that 
the empire was first and foremost a feudal structure, held together not by a legal framework 
or a constitution but rather by the bonds of loyalty formed between the emperor and the 
individual estates. The main exponent of this view of the early modern empire is perhaps 
Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger.63 Her approach is championed by some younger historians in 
Germany and by a number of, predominantly younger, US historians.64  
Stollberg-Rilinger’s overarching argument is clear. The empire existed in the immediate 
relationship between the emperor and the imperial estates. The really significant feature of 
the imperial diets was that these bonds were renewed there and that similar relationships of 
loyalty between imperial estates were forged there, for example in marriage celebrations. The 
diets were venues where power relations were performed. When these performances ceased 
in the second half of the eighteenth century, because the princes refused, for example, to pay 
homage (and fees) to Joseph II on his election as emperor in 1765, the empire was doomed. 
André Krischer has even gone so far as to suggest that the empire was essentially fictive in 
nature, existing only in the discourse of symbolic communication and the imagined realm of 
performance.65 
The very useful aspect of Stollberg-Rilinger’s work has been to draw attention again to the 
continuing importance of ritual and the symbolic into the early modern period. This was well 
known to scholars such as Hans Erich Feine in the early twentieth-century but was probably 
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neglected in some of the more recent euphoric re-evaluations of the old empire.66 Yet it 
surely cannot stand as the only story of the early modern empire. Ritual undoubtedly declined 
and many princes eschewed the symbolic discourse in which they had formerly engaged so 
enthusiastically with the emperor. But the empire itself did not fade away. 
This is perhaps one of the most remarkable and enduring aspects of the historiography of the 
old empire: the view that it was doomed to extinction at the end of the eighteenth century. No 
matter how radical or revisionist the re-evaluation, the view of its end remains almost 
uniformly negative. Yet the empire was not destroyed by the decline of its symbolic 
language, by the atrophy of its institutions or by the indifference of its inhabitants. It was 
destroyed by force of French arms over a decade and a half of ruinous warfare and by 
Napoleon’s determination that it should not continue. It had changed enormously over the 
early modern period, ending up more like a federation than a feudal polity. Was it really 
utterly unsuitable for survival into the nineteenth century? The British monarchy, too, was 
transformed from a feudal monarchy by the development of institutions and systems of law. 
Yet it retains elements of its former symbolic relationship with the nobility even today. 
Furthermore, that has not prevented the gradual development of a modern democratic society 
around it. For all the repeated assertions that the notion of a Sonderweg has been banished, it 
remains present in the master narrative: for the mythic German Sonderweg began, as Heinrich 
August Winkler asserted, with the empire and its destruction.67 
THE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THIS SPECIAL ISSUE 
The debates of the last few decades about the empire’s history, both medieval and early 
modern, underline the enormous expansion of research into these areas over recent decades. 
Despite perennial anxieties about research funding, the number of major projects has 
proliferated. Above all, the subject seems to have become attractive again to younger scholars 
and recruitment has been lively in both the German- and the English-speaking world. That is 
demonstrated by the essays collected here, by younger scholars and by older German 
scholars, which illustrate some important recent trends in research on the Holy Roman 
Empire. 
The five papers included in this special issue reflect the current state of scholarship on the 
Empire, but they also point beyond it, towards promising new directions for research. Levi 
Roach demonstrates the importance of Italy to the Ottonians, and the foundational place of 
Rome, doctrinally as well as chronologically, in the making of medieval western 
emperorship. In tracing Italy’s centrality to the decisions taken by Ottonian rulers, including 
those relating to their German territories, Roach highlights the dangers of viewing the 
medieval Empire, as it is still too often viewed, from an unreflectively Germanocentric 
standpoint. As his paper makes clear, the very concept of the ‘German’ only found 
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articulation as a result of tenth-century imperial ventures in the south. Roach’s perspective, 
which combines expertise in early-medieval Italy and in north-European kingship, remains 
regrettably rare in the field. Although, as he indicates, few subsequent medieval emperors 
were quite as much at home south of the Alps as were the Ottos (although the later Staufer 
are an obvious comparator), his insights provide later medievalists, too, with food for 
thought. If later emperors were to spend less time in the south, the place of Italy in the 
imperial imaginaire nevertheless remained surprisingly central until the time of the humanists 
at least. Why this was so, and what were the consequences for the idea and practice of 
emperorship in the north, merits further study. 
 
Gramsch-Stehfest also engages, in a different way, with north-south connections and 
disjunctions, as his subject-matter is the conflicts which resulted from the establishment, for a 
short time, of a kingship in Germany subject to the oversight of an Italy-based emperor, the 
king’s father. Drawing upon the findings of his recent monograph on the subject,68 it offers a 
transformative view of an episode in the Empire’s high-medieval history that, as the author 
convincingly shows, has long been the subject of serious misunderstanding. Accounts of the 
downfall of Frederick II’s son Henry (VII) have often dwelt upon the latter’s alleged 
personality flaws, shown up by Gramsch-Stehfest as constructions of the sources. Other 
interpretations have reflected the lingering shades of the Ficker-Sybel contest, in their 
polarized visions of a southward-facing ‘universal’ emperor versus his son, the (proto-
modern, incipiently state-building) ‘German’ king. Gramsch-Stehfest, too, brings to his work 
an unusual body of expertise, derived in his case from the exact sciences, to offer fresh and 
convincing perspectives. These allow the reader to see that it was Frederick, and not his son, 
who had failed to play the game according to the (German) ‘rules’, and whose harsh dose of 
Sicilian-style rigor justitiae, administered during his short visit in 1235-6, left such an 
impression of culture-shock in northern sources.69 It is surely only a matter of time before 
Gramsch-Stehfest’s innovative group-modelling method is applied with profit to other 
periods and episodes in the Empire’s history – including, perhaps, the post-Staufer 
‘Interregnum’ (1246-1273), which it was his original intention to study. 
 
Interconnectedness, approached in a different way, is also the theme of Duncan Hardy, in an 
essay which draws inspiration from the approaches to late-medieval German political culture 
pioneered by Peter Moraw, while also tracing paths beyond them. Hardy demonstrates the 
value of examining the Tag – a flexible, characteristically (though not exclusively) German 
associative mode, encompassing assemblies of varying form and purpose – as an especially 
revealing window on the political culture of the late-medieval Empire. His approach makes it 
easier to account for the relative cohesion and stability of the Empire’s German-speaking 
territories in this period, even in the absence of elaborate imperial institutions and given the 
weakness of the monarchs themselves. Hardy shows how the very ambiguity of the Tag-
concept was part of its strength, allowing new forms of association to emerge while still 
                                                          
68 Robert Gramsch, Das Reich als Netzwerk der Fürsten: Politische Strukturen unter dem Doppelkönigtum 
Friedrichs II. und Heinrichs (VII.) 1225-1235 (Ostfildern, 2013). 
69 See generally Theo Broekmann, Rigor iustitiae: Herrschaft, Recht und Terror im normannisch-staufischen 
Süden (1050-1250) (Darmstadt, 2005). 
18 
 
appearing comprehensible to traditional ways of thinking. His essay thus marks a further step 
towards understanding how constitutional practices in Germany actually worked and 
developed, and away from implicitly lamenting their failure to work in ways familiar from 
other places and times. It even offers the potential for making new, extensive yet finely-
nuanced, maps of political association and interconnection, to engage with and refine 
Moraw’s celebrated and useful zonal schema. 
 
Siegrid Westphal’s contribution draws attention to one of the most important new 
developments in the early modern period. It extends the work that she has so far done on 
various aspects of the legal culture of the early modern empire, including an important study 
of the operation of the empire’s supreme courts in the Thuringian region between 1648 and 
1806, investigations into the rights of women and divorce in imperial law and, most recently 
a study of the Peace of Westphalia.70 Here she explores the significance of the Public Peace 
declared in 1495 as a new constitutional framework for the early modern empire. Of course 
the Public Peace drew on medieval traditions yet it also marked a new departure. The 
institution of a higher court to enforce it and of measures to implement its decisions paved the 
way for the pacification of the German polity. In 1555 the notion of Public Peace was 
extended to include confessional matters and the whole system was confirmed by the Peace 
of Westphalia in 1648. As Westphal shows, the significance of the Public Peace endured until 
1806. It played an important role in the response to Prussian aggression in the Seven Years’ 
War. Justus Möser thought the Peace was so fundamentally important to the empire that he 
proposed writing a new history of the ‘modern’ empire which recognised the agreement of 
1495 as its fundamental constitutional law. 
Wolfgang Burgdorf draws attention to another important innovation which has also often 
been neglected: the imperial electoral capitulations, the first of which was drawn up for 
Charles V in 1519. Burgdorf is well known for a number of important and innovative 
publications. His 1998 book on the constitutional reform projects of the period 1648-1806 
offered a new view of contemporary attitudes to the empire and its future.71 In 2006 he 
proved comprehensively that the old notion that the empire had disappeared without a 
murmur from its inhabitants (‘ohne Sang und Klang’) who were allegedly utterly indifferent 
to its fate, was simply a myth.72 In recent years he has produced the first ever scholarly 
edition of the electoral capitulations and a monograph which presented them as key 
catalogues of rights and proof of the empire’s evolution into a ‘proto-constitutional’ 
monarchy in the early modern period.73 His essay here elaborates that theme and gives a 
                                                          
70 Siegrid Westphal, Kaiserliche Rechtsprechung und herrschaftliche Stabilisierung. Reichsgerichtsbarkeit in 
den thüringischen Territorialstaaten, 1648-1806 (Cologne, Weimar, Vienna, 2002); idem and Inken Schmidt-
Voges (eds), Venus und Vulcanus: Ehen und ihre Konflikte in der Frühen Neuzeit (Oldenburg, 2011); idem, Der 
Westfälische Frieden (Munich, 2015).  
71 Wolfgang Burgdorf, Reichskonstitution und Nation. Verfassungsreformprojekte für das Heilige Römische 
Reich Deutscher Nation im politischen Schrifttum von 1648 bis 1806 (Mainz, 1998). 
72 Wolfgang Burgdorf, Ein Weltbild verliert seine Welt. Der Untergang des Alten Reiches und die Generation 
1806 (Munich, 2006, 2nd edn Munich 2009). 
73 Wolfgang Burgdorf (ed.), Die Wahlkapitulationen der römisch-deutschen Könige und Kaiser. Edition 
(Göttingen, 2015). See also idem, Protokonstitutionalismus. Die Reichsverfassung in den Wahlkapitulationen 
der römisch-deutschen Könige und Kaiser (Göttingen, 2015). 
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fascinating insight into the content of key documents which all scholars of the empire cite but 
few have ever seriously read. 
Collectively these essays provide excellent insights into the tendencies in current research 
into the Holy Roman Empire. How will things develop from here? There is already a plethora 
of younger scholars taking forward the themes represented here. It seems likely, too, that both 
the history of symbolic communication and material history will develop further in ways that 
may enhance our understanding of the broad history of the empire. Further reflection is also 
needed on the place of the empire in German history: the ways that it shaped structures and 
attitudes in the long term. The one thing that we can be sure about is that the dearth of 
reading that frustrated young historians sixty or seventy years ago is unlikely to be a problem 
in the future. 
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